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One of the most important relationships in constitutional law is that between two concepts
at the heart of the American legal system: property and speech. Yet despite increased
scholarly attention, the relationship remains largely mysterious. Does property simply
enable speech acts, or can it have its own expressive content? And what kind of
“property” is important to speech—places and things, formal legal entitlements, or social
norms? This short Article and the longer piece on which it is based attempt to explain why
those questions matter, and to offer some tentative answers.
The close connection between property and speech not only underlies much First
Amendment doctrine, but has the potential to transform it, not least by breaking down the
line between forum analysis and government speech. The former holds that the
government’s right as a property owner to exclude unwanted speakers is tightly limited.
The latter, on the other hand, holds that when the government “speaks”—including, as in
Pleasant Grove v. City of Summum, through exercise of the right to exclude1—it is exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny. In other words, government speech doctrine can
reinvigorate the government’s power to exclude unwanted private speakers by, in effect,
transforming government property into government speech and thereby placing it beyond
the reach of the First Amendment.
This conclusion cannot be right, but showing why it is wrong and how it could be improved
is no easy matter. The government speech-government property cases, I argue, have
given the right answer to the wrong question. The issue is not whether the government has
been expressive by exercising its right to exclude, but rather whether the government has
that right in the first place. How should we begin to answer that question? A partial
answer may lie in the simple recognition that, at least when it comes to speech, property is
not simply a matter of legal entitlements.
I. Speech and Three Types of Property
One of the many reasons that the relationship between property and speech has proven
so difficult to define is because property itself is a hard concept to pin down. It has at least
three meanings: a place or thing, a legal entitlement, and a social norm. Those three
conceptions of property lead to three different views of the property-speech interface,
though in each of them property can both enable speech acts and have its own
expressive qualities.
First, property can be understood as a place or thing: a house, a sign, a newspaper, a
park, or a monument, for example. This concept is undoubtedly what most people—non-
lawyers anyway—mean when they refer to property.2 And certainly such property is
essential to free speech, which is why restrictions on the ownership or use of physical
property—whether Speaker’s Corner, a loudspeaker, or a printing press—are often
recognized as restrictions on speech. People communicate on and through places and
things. Therefore, in the simplest sense, it is clearly correct to say that property is related
to speech.
But of course lawyers use the word “property” to refer to something different: not places or
things, but the “bundle of rights” that includes the power to exclude, transfer, and so on. 3
Even at this level of abstraction, however, property is still very much a part of a system of
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free expression. The right to exclude, to take only the most important stick in the bundle of
rights, is essential to many forms of speech. Associations, for example, send messages of
approval and disapproval by excluding and including members. The Boy Scouts’ exclusion
of an openly gay scoutmaster in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale comes to mind. 4
Similarly, when a person chooses to include campaign posters on his front lawn, he sends
a message of approval by declining to exclude them. Thus it also seems true that this
second conception of property—as a form of legal entitlement—is closely intertwined with
speech.
There is at least one more important approach to thinking about property; one that
focuses less on formal, state-backed entitlements and instead on “informal” entitlements
like social norms. This vision of property as a social relationship or custom is perhaps less
recognized than the first two conceptions, but it is nonetheless a powerful strand of
property theory and doctrine. As Robert Ellickson and others have shown, formal legal
entitlements are not always as practically important as the socially recognized norms and
customs governing property’s use. 5 Again, Dale is potentially illustrative. In that case, a
New Jersey antidiscrimination statute forbade the Boy Scouts from excluding
homosexuals. In effect, the Scouts had been stripped of their formal legal right to exclude.
And yet the Scouts argued that being forced to include unwanted members would force
them to project a message they did not support. 6 It follows that the unwanted
communication must derive from something other than formal legal entitlements.
Separating these three definitions of property is useful for many reasons. First, it
demonstrates that “property” is itself a contested and complicated idea, and that any
efforts to make sense of the property-speech relationship must come to grips with
property’s many faces. Second, the distinct definitions show that the various meanings of
property will not necessarily point in the same direction. At times, the social understanding
of property will not match up with underlying legal entitlements. Imagine, for example, that
the government grants a private party the formal rights to a small plot of land in the midst
of a vast public park. On that small plot, the private party constructs and maintains a piece
of religious iconography. A casual observer, unaware of the precise metes and bounds of
the government’s legal entitlements, will almost certainly perceive the cross to be standing
on government land, and will therefore perceive a potential Establishment Clause
violation, even though the cross is, in fact, privately owned. 7
These complications are to some degree inevitable, and it is not the purpose of this Article
to resolve them fully. To the contrary, the fact that different conceptions of property can
enable different types of speech tends to confirm the central argument that property, of
whatever kind, plays an essential role in speech.
II. The Thorny Problem of Government Property and
Government Speech
So far so good. It seems intuitively correct that property rights, however conceived, are
closely related to speech, and that the exercise of those rights should at times be
considered an expressive act within the protection of the First Amendment. But the
implications of that simple-sounding conclusion become complicated when the property
owner at issue is the government. For if exclusions are expressive, then excluding
unwanted speakers from public property may itself be a form of “government speech”
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. And this characterization, in turn, would suggest
that the public forum itself might disappear in a puff of government speech.
The evolution of forum doctrine is essentially a century-long erosion of the government’s
right to exclude unwanted speakers from its land. Accordingly, the government has no
power to exclude private speakers simply because it disagrees with their viewpoints. But
the Court’s newly minted government speech doctrine, whose reach and import remain
unclear, exempts the government’s own speech from First Amendment coverage. 8 When
the government is speaking, the rule goes, it can say what it wants. That doctrine,
combined with the property-speech relationship discussed above, creates a dangerous
and potentially enormous loophole to the usual public forum rules. For if by excluding the
unwanted speaker the government is “speaking,” then its actions are exempt from the First
Amendment, rather than bound by it.
Consider the archetypical First Amendment scenario of a person wishing to speak in a
public park. The government owns the land, and thus, constitutional considerations aside,
it has a presumptive right to exclude people and things, just like any property owner. The
right to exclude, after all, is often called the sine qua non of property. Under basic forum
analysis, however, nothing could be clearer than the fact that the government has no right
to exclude the speaker based simply on a disagreement with his message.
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But what if the government were to characterize its exclusion of the unwanted speaker as
the government’s own speech? Part I of this Article, after all, has argued that the exercise
of property rights can itself be an expressive act. If I eject protestors from my land
because I disagree with their message (or allow them to use it because I agree), then
surely I have engaged in expressive conduct that would fall within the First Amendment’s
bounds. Why should this action be any less expressive when the government is the one
doing the excluding? And if the government’s exercise of its right to exclude is expressive
and therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, of what use is the public forum?
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Summum and Buono frame the issues nicely. In
the former case, a religious order called the Summum sought to erect a monument in a
government-owned park that already featured other religious iconography, including a
prominent Ten Commandments monument.9 Pleasant Grove City refused to permit the
Summum monument, thus exercising its right to exclude. The Summum sued, arguing that
the exclusion represented impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a public forum.
Pleasant Grove City responded that the exclusion was in fact government speech, and
therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. The Court sided with the City,
emphasizing that the City had “taken ownership of most of the monuments in the Park,”
and that “[t]he monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have
the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government
speech.” 10 In other words, the Court held that by exercising its property rights, both
formally and as they were socially recognized, Pleasant Grove City was also engaging in
expression.
In Buono, the Court faced a scenario in which the formal and social understandings of
property pointed in different directions. In that case, a Latin cross had been privately
constructed and maintained for almost seventy years in the midst of a vast public park. 11
In an effort to remedy this recognized Establishment Clause violation, Congress attempted
to convey to a private party the small piece of property on which the cross stood, with the
apparent understanding that the cross would remain in place. However complete and
effective this transfer would be as a matter of formal property law in accordance with the
second conception of property described above, it surely would not be sufficient to totally
change public perception of who owned and approved the cross under the third
conception. In a fractured set of opinions, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court for further consideration of the context and intent of the Congressional
enactment. The Court’s decision to leave open the possibility of a continuing
Establishment Clause violation, despite the government’s divestiture of formal title,
indicates its willingness to consider the relationship between government speech and
government property as involving more than simply formal property rights.
Summum and Buono demonstrate the complications of the government property-
government speech interface. The line separating government speech and the public
forum is exceptionally thin, but it divides vastly different worlds of doctrine. In one,
viewpoint-based exclusions are strictly forbidden; in the other, they are entirely exempt
from scrutiny.
III. Saving the Public Forum from Government Speech
Part II of this short Article explores the Pandora’s Box that Part I opens—namely, that the
connection between property and speech, innocuous as it may be in the context of private
property, threatens the very existence of the public forum in the context of government
property. This Part attempts to close the box, at least partially, by suggesting ways to
save the public forum from being swallowed by “expressive” uses of government property.
One important and potentially useful starting point is the fact that not all exercises of
property rights are necessarily expressive, just as not all sounds are speech. That is,
simply because exclusion can express a message does not mean that it always does.
Consider, for example, a park that is not large enough to permit all would-be speakers to
speak at once. If the park’s owner—the government, let’s say—sets a rule permitting the
first twenty speakers to talk for half an hour each, then the twenty-first speaker to arrive
will be excluded, but not for any reason that we would recognize as expressive. The same
could be said of possible allocation rules for any scarce resource: parade permits,
bandwidth access, broadcast rights, and so on. The basic laws of physics may require the
forum’s owner to exclude some private parties in order to protect the forum from being
totally overrun, but do not require the owner to “say” anything in doing so.
This concern over scarce allocation of resources, in fact, seems to underlie the result in
Summum. The Court was troubled by the fact that Pleasant Grove City’s park could not
support an infinite number of monuments, and the prospect of a private First Amendment
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right to place monuments in the park seemed to threaten the very existence of the forum.
The Court recognized that “forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which
government-owned property or a government program was capable of accommodating a
large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or the
program.” 12 But, the Court found, treating monument construction in the park as a public
forum would lead to clutter that would effectively limit the ability of private speakers to
express themselves. And “where the application of forum analysis would lead almost
inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.” 13
This may well be so. The Court has recognized, for example, that “two parades cannot
march on the same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one.” 14 But
recognizing that the government must be able to manage the forum is not the same as
concluding that the government speaks by doing so. It is easy to imagine rules that would
prevent overuse of a public forum without necessarily communicating the government’s
own view. A first-come first-served rule, for example, would prevent a tragedy of the
speech commons without itself being speech. Indeed, such forum-protecting rules would
presumably withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment’s usual tests for time, place,
and manner restrictions.15 This suggests that the government can enact speech-making
rules that would pass constitutional muster without being exempted from the First
Amendment entirely.
The question therefore remains, albeit in narrowed form: Even if not all exclusions are
expressive, how are we to separate those that are from those that are not? There is no
easy answer, any more, or less, than there is an easy way to identify public forums.
Certainly the answer cannot lie entirely within the formal view of property as a legal
entitlement. Were that the case, then the government could transform public forums into
government speech at will, since the government holds formal legal entitlements over
nearly all public forums.
A more promising place to start is with the idea of property as it is socially recognized.
Consider, for example, a test that would ask whether the government intended to convey
a particularized message and whether a reasonable observer would believe it to be doing
so. Such a test would shift attention away from the formal allocation of property rights (the
second conception from Part I) and toward the way they are socially recognized (the third
conception). As noted above, the Court in Buono seemed to approve just such a test,
looking past the fact that the disputed cross stood on private land, and thus implicitly
taking into account the fact that a reasonable viewer might well attribute its ownership to
the government.
This approach may sound attractive in theory but impossible in practice. After all, can we
really expect courts to view property through the lens of social recognition rather than the
comparatively bright lines offered by the legal entitlements approach? In practice, it turns
out, courts have often been willing to consider social understandings of property, rather
than simply title ownership. In Evans v. Newton 16 and Evans v. Abney, 17 for example,
the Court found that Equal Protection was implicated by the administration of a whites-
only park even though the park was, as a formal matter, administered by private trustees.
In other words, the Court recognized both that exclusion of blacks amounted to
expression of white supremacy and that the “momentum [the park] acquired as a public
facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of ‘private’ trustees.” 18
Formal ownership was therefore only part of the story.
If government property is itself expressive, then the very search for a line between public
forum and government speech that has so bedeviled courts and scholars is itself
somewhat misguided. Instead, what is needed is a way to separate expressive exclusions
from those that are not or should not be recognized as such. This short Article has
attempted to take a step in that direction.
Conclusion
The relationship between property and expression was complicated enough before
government speech doctrine came along. Courts and scholars have sometimes concluded
that expression relies on physical things and places to be effective; or that proper
allocation of intellectual property rights can incentivize creative expression; or, as some
philosophers and sociologists argue, that places themselves convey meaning. But making
sense of the property-expression interface requires an even more nuanced understanding
of both concepts. Expression is more than just speech, and “property” is far more
multifaceted than First Amendment scholars have recognized. It can be a place or thing, a
legal entitlement, or even a social norm or understanding. Disaggregating the notion of
property in this threefold way illuminates the various ways in which the relationship
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between property and expression is not simply a simplistic or instrumental one.
But even as it sheds light on the mechanisms of free speech, this account threatens the
very doctrine that protects it. For if property is expressive, then government property might
effectively become government speech, which is in turn exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny. That simple move of characterization therefore threatens to dissolve the public
forum, which has heretofore been thought of as central to free expression.
There is no easy way to close this Pandora’s Box. The exercise of property rights is
undoubtedly expressive, and—as a formal matter, anyway—the government has property
rights over many public forums. But the answer to the conundrum may lie in looking past
formal legal entitlements, and instead embracing a thicker, richer view of property as a
social institution.
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